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theoretical potential of sectoral crediting mechanisms and incentives for participation of developing 
countries in financing climate change actions. Following the outcome of the UNFCCC conference in 
Copenhagen, it makes no specific assumptions about the future international climate regime. The 
analysis suggests that more of a carbon market we have when moving from the project-based CDM 
to sectoral crediting mechanisms and internationally linked cap-and-trade, the more finance the 
carbon market will channel to developing countries. Relative to the baseline in 2020, global 
emissions fall by more than 24% at a cost of 0.3% of world Gross Domestic Product (GDP), while 
the international financial transfers to developing countries amount to a tentative €32 billion. The 
improved environmental outcome comes foremost from enhanced participation of developing 
countries that start to take on targets. A consideration of the current financial crisis in the baseline 
translates into relatively lower costs of all policy options, because the emission targets are defined in 
terms of pre-crisis emission levels. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper gives a model-based analysis evaluating the economic impacts of an international 
agreement on climate change to succeed the Kyoto Protocol. The paper assesses the theoretical 
potential of expanding the international carbon market through sectoral crediting mechanisms and 
active participation of developing countries in financing climate change actions compared to the 
existing project-based carbon market mechanisms.  
The model used is an extended climate change version of the WorldScan model developed by the 
CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis. This is a multi-region and multi-sector 
applied general equilibrium model, which distinguishes between different manufacturing and non-
manufacturing sectors of the economy for individual advanced and emerging countries, such as 
Brazil, China and India. The objective is to use this model to understand better the issues of 
Copenhagen and to evaluate particularly the issues related to the role of the global carbon market 
and the volume of financial flows between developed and developing countries, while bearing in 
mind environmental effectiveness and cost efficiency. The extended version of WorldScan, 
developed to meet the purpose of this paper, explicitly considers the existing carbon market 
mechanisms in the Kyoto period and incorporates new sectoral crediting approaches and 
participation of developing countries to assess their cost-efficiency and potential environmental 
benefits. 
The simulation results reveal some insights into three post-Kyoto scenarios, which describe a 
frictionless global carbon market, the role of new sectoral approaches and the role of enhanced 
participation of developing countries in financing climate change actions. In a nutshell, the first 
scenario serves as a cost-effective benchmark scenario, which assumes a perfect global carbon 
market by 2013 and a normal evolution of the Kyoto Protocol until 2012.
5 The second scenario 
considers enhanced participation of developing countries in financing climate change actions, 
while the third scenario investigates the role of sectoral mechanisms with sector-specific baseline 
targets for emissions. The analysis is based on CO2 emissions and does not account for REDD 
and LULUCF as abatement options. No use is made of excess Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) 
from the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol to meet the 2020 emission reduction 
targets. 
The results show that the world's largest emission reductions of 24% at 0.3% loss of national 
income by 2020 are achieved under the global carbon market scenario, while the volume of 
financial transfers to developing countries amounts to a tentative €32 billion. The analysis 
suggests that more of a carbon market we have when moving from the project-based CDM to 
sectoral crediting mechanisms (SCM) and internationally linked cap-and-trade, the more finance 
the carbon market will channel to developing countries. The improved environmental outcome 
comes foremost from enhanced participation of developing countries that start to take on targets 
and hence the carbon price leads to reductions above and beyond the own action. The analysis 
also shows that the current economic crisis is likely to reduce the costs of climate-policy options, 
resulting in a lower carbon price and lower volumes of private international financial flows 
through the global carbon market. This is simply due to the fact that emissions in the baseline 
adjusted for the crisis fall short of emissions in the pre-crisis baseline, while the emission targets 
are defined in terms of pre-crisis emission levels. Although rather indicative and economically 
intuitive, these results have to be interpreted with caution by taking into account the underlying 
assumptions. 
 
5The Kyoto Protocol was adopted in Kyoto, Japan, on 11 December 1997 and entered into force on 16 February 2005. 184 
Parties of the Convention have ratified its Protocol to date. The detailed rules for the implementation of the Protocol were 
adopted at COP 7 in Marrakesh in 2001, and are called the Marrakesh Accords. The Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol 
referring to the CDM is outlined in the Annex of our paper.                  European Economy - Economic Papers  No 406 
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The remainder of the paper has the following structure. Section 2 provides a conceptual 
framework to the modelling exercise as it describes the existing carbon market mechanisms under 
the Kyoto Protocol. It also discusses the role of new sectoral approaches and incentives for 
participation of developing countries in financing climate change actions. Section 3 gives an 
overview of the main characteristics of the model and highlights its advantages and shortcomings. 
This section also explains some technical features of the model that are necessary to understand 
its operation at the sectoral level and the implementation of the environmental policy instruments. 
Section 4 details the policy scenarios and outlines the underlying assumptions. Section 5 presents 
the simulation results and section 6 discusses how these are affected when the impact of the 
current economic crisis is also taken into account. Section 7 concludes. 
2. Conceptual Background 
Addressing climate change incurs costs. The costs and the environmental effectiveness of 
underlying actions depend crucially on the international environmental regulation. At the current 
stage, different financing options to tackle climate change in developing countries exist. However, 
the purpose of this paper is not to provide an extensive overview of the existing financing 
vehicles, but rather to focus on the advantages of new sectoral mechanisms and incentives for 
actions by developing countries compared to the existing carbon market mechanisms. 
In particular, the financing options need not come only from the carbon market and international 
public finance, but also from developing countries' own contributions. While the scale of 
domestic policy action in developing countries is not yet fully clarified, it is clear that 
significantly increased international flows of public and private finance will be necessary to 
support a global abatement policy. Sectoral crediting mechanisms could further improve the 
functioning of the existing project-based mechanism by defining sector-specific baseline targets 
for emissions. In other words, an environmentally effective climate change action will have to 
meet emission targets by reducing emissions beyond business as usual levels (BAUs) taking into 
account the characteristics of manufacturing and utility sectors in developing countries. 
Additional financial support by developed countries is needed to help tackle the economic costs of 
climate change actions, namely the mitigation and adaptation costs. Mitigation costs arise from 
altering patterns of investment and spending to reduce greenhouse gas emissions as the carbon-
intensive technologies will gradually be replaced by low-carbon technologies. Adaptation costs 
arise from changes in the behaviour of individuals, firms and societies to adapt to climate change. 
These costs represent a significant financial burden for developing and least developed countries. 
Aimed at supporting climate change actions in developing countries, financial transfers from 
developed to developing countries are justified on efficiency and equity grounds. In line with the 
economic efficiency principle, a global reduction of greenhouse gas emissions at least cost 
requires a reduction in emissions in regions with low-cost abatement possibilities, such as 
developing countries. Equity considerations also argue for financial support towards developing 
countries, notably for adaptation actions in the least developed countries.
6 The volume of 
financial transfers that developing countries will receive from the EU and other developed 
countries for tackling climate change will thus be at the heart of comprehensive international 
action. 
At present, funding is channelled through both multilateral and bilateral sources and this is 
unlikely to change. Maintaining a variety of funding sources and instruments seems preferable to 
a more highly centralized system of financing, because it addresses a wide range of funding 
needs. It ensures that donors have adequate control over funding streams and stimulates 
competition between different funding mechanisms towards greater performance. However, the 
existing financing mechanisms allegedly do not deliver satisfactory environmental benefits at the 
  2 
                                                 
6Their societies and economies are among those most exposed to the risks of climate change, they are poorly placed to 
adapt to its effects, but they have contributed little to the build-up of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. 
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lowest possible costs. As addressed further in this paper, it is therefore relevant to assess whether 
alternative mechanisms could reduce the shortcomings of existing financing mechanisms. 
2.1. International Carbon Market Mechanisms  
The Kyoto Protocol has created three carbon market mechanisms. The CDM and Joint 
Implementation (JI) are project-based mechanisms, while the international emissions trading 
mechanism is based on targets expressed in assigned amount units (AAUs). The transfer of JI 
credits and AAUs occurs between Annex I countries, whereas the CDM leads to financial 
transfers to developing countries and it is therefore relevant for the debate on financing options in 
developing countries.
7 
In the context of EU climate policy, the CDM operates either through government purchase 
programmes by Member States or through the EU-wide Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). 
On the one hand, the government purchase programmes include the procurement of CDM credits 
as a contribution to compliance with the Kyoto target for the period 2008 to 2012. On the other 
hand, the CDM credits are recognized as a compliance currency in the EU ETS. The CDM allows 
a country with an emission reduction commitment under the Kyoto Protocol to reduce emissions 
through the implementation of projects in developing countries.
8 Such projects generate Certified 
Emission Reduction (CER) credits equivalent to one tonne of CO2, which can be traded within the 
EU ETS. At present, the project-based segment of the international carbon market is dominated 
by trade in Certified Emission Reductions (CERs).
9 The international carbon market including 
project-based transactions, secondary CDM and allowances markets reached almost 5 billion 
tCO2eq worth €86 billion, of which the EU ETS accounted for the lion's share of 3 billion tCO2eq 
worth €63 billion (Ambrosi and Capoor, 2009). 
Although the CDM is an important element of the international carbon market because it reduces 
the costs by providing access to offsetting mechanisms, it is loose on efficiency grounds and 
allegedly does not deliver the expected environmental benefits. With regard to the CDM scale, it 
is questionable whether the current project-based format delivers a sufficient amount of offsets 
from those sectors where most emissions occur. With regard to the environmental effectiveness, a 
continued use of pure offsetting mechanisms may undermine incentives for developing countries 
to implement own mitigation actions that do not generate credits. In sum, the new international 
agreement should envisage crediting mechanisms that go beyond mere offsetting and instead 
stimulate appropriate own actions in developing countries. Moreover, it would be more efficient if 





7The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is an offsetting mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol through which 
developed countries may finance greenhouse-gas emission reduction in developing countries and receive credits for doing 
so, which they may apply towards meeting mandatory limits on their own emissions in developed countries. 
8The Kyoto Protocol included enabling language in Article 12 laying down the main architecture for the mechanism in 
1997 (see Annex B). A few years later, decisions 3 and 4 of the first COP/MOP within the so-called Marrakech Accords 
have activated the CDM. In the meantime further COP/MOP decisions have extended the CDM regulation. 
9According to the World Bank's report State and Trends of the Carbon Market 2009, forward primary CDM transactions 
accounted for the largest share of activity in the primary market, with overall confirmed transaction volumes of 389 
MtCO2e, which is nearly 30% lower than in 2007 (552 MtCO2e). Primary CER prices in 2008 were an average of 16% 
higher at €11.46, but the value of transactions decreased by 12% from 2007 levels to €4.5 billion. The 2008 average price 
reflects higher prices paid before the financial crisis, compared to much lower prices in low volume of transactions in 
2008. Most of the CERs were generated by projects in China, which accounts for about three quarters of the total 
transactions (Ambrosi and Capoor, 2009). 
10Apart from that, there are other shortcomings of the CDM. Notably, the approval procedures for CDM projects are 
currently lengthy and complex. This increases transaction costs and represents an obstacle to the large-scale expansion of 
the CDM. Partly because of its complexity, CDM projects are in practice concentrated in a small number of more 
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2.2. Sectoral Mechanisms and Enhanced Participation of Developing Countries  
A possible next step that would go towards solving the problems with the existing carbon market 
mechanisms is to move gradually to a new sectoral crediting mechanism. A baseline target for 
emissions would be agreed for a sector. Sectoral credits would only be issued for reductions in 
emissions that go beyond an agreed ambitious goal that is, defined in a “do something” baseline.
11 
If such a new mechanism were to cover the energy-intensive sectors, it would also help to reduce 
concerns in developed countries about carbon leakage.
12 A sectoral crediting mechanism would 
allow an easier transition for advanced developing countries to start introducing mitigation 
policies for their highly competitive economic sectors. Progress needs to be made on a number of 
issues related to their design and implementation, if sectoral approaches are to contribute to 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
13 In any such approach, practical questions will need to be 
agreed, such as the definition of the participating sectors and the baseline against which emission 
reductions should be credited. A more difficult set of issues may be those relating to the differing 
interests and incentives in developed and developing countries for negotiating and taking part in 
the sectoral arrangement. 
For example, developed countries see sectoral mechanisms as a way to limit concerns about 
carbon leakage and adverse effects on competitiveness that may result from ambitious climate 
change policies. However, many low-cost emission abatement opportunities in developing 
countries are in the electricity sector. The power sector is thus a prime candidate for a future 
sectoral crediting mechanism. Developing countries may see sectoral arrangements as a way of 
enabling technology transfer. However, proprietary technology may be a source of competitive 
advantage for firms in developed countries. Developing countries will need to devise ways to 
ensure that firms and investors receive a clear carbon price signal, if the sectoral arrangement is to 
deliver emission reductions cost-effectively. Provided that environmentally effective solutions to 
these challenges can be found, sectoral approaches have the potential to scale up financial flows 
through the international carbon market, and give incentives to developing countries to implement 
domestic climate change mitigation policies. At the same time a well-designed sectoral crediting 
mechanism would also facilitate the subsequent transition to cap-and-trade. Because of the variety 
in the situations of individual firms, sectors and countries, the characteristics of particular sectoral 
mechanisms may have to be adjusted to underlying conditions. 
A future international agreement should ideally set general criteria for sectors and countries that 
are no longer allowed to participate in the CDM and can therefore only use sectoral approaches. 
However, an international agreement on clear-cut eligibility rules will be difficult to reach. 
Should developing countries oppose losing CDM eligibility, it is important to put in place 
participation incentives for sectoral approaches. Namely, the advantages of sectoral mechanisms 
for developing countries could come from different sources. For example, the sectoral credits 
could bring down the transaction costs for installations in a developing country and could further 
be recognized for the EU ETS compliance at more favourable quantitative conditions than the 
CDM. An internationally agreed sectoral mechanism could also help address competitiveness 
concerns as industrialised countries adopt more ambitious mitigation objectives, while providing 
an opportunity to promote investment in low-carbon technologies (Bosi and Elis, 2005; Baron and 
Elis, 2006; Burniaux et al., 2009). 
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11The term “do something” baseline is used to contrast it to the CDM which is based on "do-nothing" baselines, that is, 
earning credits for any deviation from business-as-usual. 
12The climate policy can generate spillovers in terms of carbon leakage, where the regions with stringent policy will lower 
their emissions leading to increasing emissions in regions with looser policy instruments, such as a low carbon tax for the 
case of carbon dioxide emissions. 
13For example, a great deal of recent debate evolves around the nature and stringency of the crediting threshold, the scope 




                                                
3. The Modelling Framework 
3.1. General Structure of the Model 
The WorldScan model describes the global economy by considering the interlinkages between 
different sectors and regions connected by bilateral trade flows. This is a multi-sector, multi-
region, applied general equilibrium model developed by the CPB in the Netherlands (Lejour et al., 
2006). There are two main characteristics of the extended climate change version that make the 
model suitable for studying sectoral approaches and participation of individual emerging 
economies in the context of climate change. First, the model can distinguish as many goods and 
services markets for individual developed and emerging economies as are accounted for in the 
database.
14 Second, the model covers carbon dioxide greenhouse gases (GHG) and describes 
comprehensively climate policy instruments such as the CDM. The recursive dynamics nature of 
this model makes it more suitable for long-term analysis than for short-term analysis, nesting 
specific assumptions about the current state and projected values of parameters and policy 
designs. Therefore, this section not only presents the model structure, but also highlights some of 
its main advantages and limitations to facilitate the interpretation of results. 
In general, WorldScan builds upon the neoclassical heritage of applied general equilibrium 
models.
15 As such, it explicitly determines simultaneous equilibrium on a large number of 
markets, including product, labour and capital markets, and it is solved as an equation system that 
represents a computable general equilibrium (CGE).
16 On the one hand, there is a macro-
economic perspective on production, consumption and investment, so that countries can run trade 
imbalances and investment does not necessarily have to match savings, whereby trade implies 
changes in the financial position of a country. On the other hand, the model has strong 
microeconomic foundations concerning producer and consumer behaviour. In particular, all 
agents are price-takers. Producers minimize the costs of production and consumers maximize 
utility subject to budget constraints, while trade patterns depend on regional differences in 
technology, endowments, demand and trading costs. 
Taking a brief look at the interplay of different modelling blocks, our focus lies on the sectoral 
dimension of the model in the climate change context. Each sector is described by a representative 
firm that supplies a unique variety of a good in each country.
17 All prices are formed 
endogenously, given the behaviour of producers and consumers. The relative demand for 
production inputs depends on the characteristics of the sectoral production function. All goods are 
produced with labour, capital and intermediate inputs and their substitutability is exogenously 
defined within the system of nested production functions.
18 However, the allocation of inputs is 
the key to sectoral heterogeneity across countries, because their production shares are derived 
from the data. In principle, total factor productivity growth is exogenous in the climate change 
version of the model. 
 
14There is a global coverage of manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors for individual countries, including emerging 
economies like China, India, Brazil and South Africa. With respect to climate policies, the model distinguishes between 
developed Annex I countries and developing countries, referred to as Non-Annex I countries according to the Kyoto 
Protocol. 
15The Walrasian general equilibrium prevails when supply and demand are globally equalized across all interconnected 
markets. Computable general equilibrium models are simulations that combine the theoretical general equilibrium 
structure with realistic economic data to solve numerically for the levels of supply, demand and price that support 
equilibrium across a specified set of markets (see Sue Wing, 2009). The mechanisms of the model are founded on 
empirical analysis wherever this is possible. 
16In other words, the sectoral inter-linkages in general equilibrium context imply that the impact of climate change policies 
to, e.g., energy sectors is streamed further down to the rest of economy. 
17In the current version of the WorldScan climate change model, the intra-sector heterogeneity of firms is not considered 
so that all firms within one sector share the production technology and exhibit the same total factor productivity. For 
example, this limitation of the model does not allow a neo-Schumpeterian type of analysis of firm dynamics under 
different climate change policy scenarios. 
18For example, capital and labour inputs are mutually substitutable to a much higher degree than, for example, capital and 
intermediate inputs. The model is flexible in adjustment of sector-specific parameters of production and cost functions by 
modifying the input share parameters or considering new technologies.                  European Economy - Economic Papers  No 406 
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The labour input consists of low-skill and high-skill workers that do not commute between 
different regions. The labour markets are thus cleared nationally and the wage rates are flexible. 
Although unemployment can be made endogenous in the model, in the simulations for this paper 
it was simply kept exogenous.
19 Labour supply is derived from demographic trends and projected 
rates of labour participation and was also kept exogenous. Workers decide how to spend their 
income in three stages; first, over consumption and savings,
20 second, by purchasing goods and 
services and leisure, and finally, by spending on goods and services supplied from abroad. 
In doing so, consumers supply the capital that firms demand. Although there is inter-regional 
capital mobility, capital price equalization is not fully met due to prevailing investment barriers. 
As for capital markets, international markets for goods and services are linked to each other. 
Trade in each variety occurs at the sectoral level and depends on its relative price, substitution 
possibilities, transportation costs, trade and non-trade barriers, and on consumer preferences. The 
trade dimension makes sector specialization more realistic and inter-regional trade linkages allow 
the assessment of the spillover effects of climate change policies, i.e. carbon leakage to regions 
with a less stringent carbon policy. 
Although the behaviour of producers and consumers is to a certain degree included in the model, 
there is no specific behaviour assigned to the government. Tax and tariff rates on production and 
consumption are determined exogenously and fed-back in the economy through lump-sum 
transfers to the households characterized in the model. 
Regarding the dynamics in the model, value added grows with labour productivity and labour 
supply. Labour productivity is determined by technological progress and capital growth per unit 
of labour. Labour supply growth is exogenous and derived from population growth, its age-
composition, age-specific participation rates, and unemployment rates. The model lacks rational 
expectations with longer time horizons, since it is not a fully forward looking inter-temporal 
optimization model. In other words, the agents in the model cannot anticipate the policy shocks. 
The model is an excellent tool for impact assessments of alternative policies, but neither intended 
for forecasting nor for monetary analyses as it does not cover asset markets and assumes 
monetary neutrality. 
WorldScan offers a flexible modelling framework that feeds on sectoral data including input-
output tables and trade linkages between sectors of different regions in the world. The main 
source used is the database of the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP). The current version of 
the model relies upon the 7th version of the GTAP database, which has 2004 as the base-year. 
The full GTAP Version 7 database covers consistent accounts integrated with bilateral trade flows 
for 57 sectors and 113 regions of the world. WorldScan simulations will not demonstrate these 
data in full detail, but they will rather present the results for aggregated sectors and country 
classifications.
21 From this data set we do not only derive the demand, production and trade 
patterns, but also the labour and capital intensity of the different sectors. Additional data sources 
used to calibrate WorldScan are described in more detail in Annex A of this paper. 
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Nonetheless as discussed above, the model is not short of limitations and the assumptions have to 
be seriously taken into account when interpreting the results, like in any other economic model. 
However, WorldScan has some very useful properties that make it attractive for our purpose. The 
next sub-sections explain in more detail its useful consideration of sectoral dimensions and 
climate change policy instruments. One of the model’s advantages therefore is that the 
heterogeneity of sectors with region-specific energy intensities and modelling of the carbon 
market leads to asymmetric impacts from climate change policies.
22 The modelling framework 
 
19Labour supply and unemployment can be treated endogenously, since there is a wage bargaining model to derive the 
wage curve and equilibrium unemployment. However, in the simulations of this paper, endogenous labour market 
responses were switched off.  
20Savings lead investments and depend on the demographic composition of the population and the growth rate of per 
capita income. 
21Main countries and country groups of interest are EU15, EU12, EU27, USA, China, India, Brazil, Annex I and non-
Annex I countries. 
22The energy sector is explained in great detail and the model distinguishes between seven primary energy carriers, as 
  
presented below is derived entirely from the WorldScan climate change model and supported by 
the description provided by Lejour et al. (2006), which includes a more detailed description of the 
general model. 
3.2. Sectoral Disaggregation of Supply and Demand 
3.2.1. The System of Nested Production Functions 
In WorldScan, all sectors s  are heterogeneous within and across regions r  with respect to 
allocation of production factors f. The aggregate output of an economy is thus an aggregation of 
the value added of individual sectors, so that gross domestic product in market prices (Yr) sums 
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An important characteristic of the WorldScan model is that the production technology is 
described by a nested structure of constant elasticity of substitution elasticity (CES). In particular, 
the sectors are heterogeneous in terms of substitution elasticities and in factor allocation shares in 
the production nest that is illustrated by Figure 1. The advantage of WorldScan is that it 
distinguishes between different energy carriers in the energy production nest, i.e. electricity and 
seven non-electricity carriers which are coal, natural gas, petroleum products, biodiesel, ethanol, 
biomass, and renewables (geothermal, solar, and wind energy).
25 The production and demand 
structure of energy carriers follows the functional specification of the other goods and services 
sectors, defined at the upper levels of the production function.
26 
For presentation purposes consider the upper-level nested structure in Figure 1. In the first level, 
production is described by the use of fixed resource input and other variable inputs, which cover 
 
further explained in the next sub-section. The carbon dioxide GHG are explicitly modelled, while other non-CO2 gases 
like methane and nitrous oxide are currently not considered. 
23Taxes are sector (s) dependent and include the taxes on consumer goods, intermediate goods, investment goods, 
production, imports and exports in region (r). 
24In the current version of the WorldScan climate change model, the intra-sector heterogeneity of firms is not considered. 
In other words, the firms within each sector (s) of region (r) have the same nested production technology and are 
homogeneous with respect to input allocation and productive efficiency. 
25The nuclear generation of electricity is included in the electricity nest (ELY). There is no overlapping between electricity 
nest (ELY) and the non-coal nest (TNC), as long as the electricity output shares for each individual economy are 
consistently reported in the data. Since the GTAP dataset does not allow any further disaggregation of energy carriers, the 
information on the shares of each individual carrier for each economy is provided by the Netherlands Environmental 
Assessment Agency (PBL). 
26The distinguishing feature of the energy sector is resource availability. Two developments in energy technology are 
important, i.e. the efficiency of energy use and the availability of new energy carriers. WorldScan defines non-fossil 
renewable fuels (nuclear, geothermal, solar and wind energy) as a backstop technology. The demand for energy carriers 
derives mostly from the production sectors (70-85%) for intermediate use while the remainder is used directly by the 
households.                  European Economy - Economic Papers  No 406 
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on the one hand intermediate inputs and on the other hand the nested structure of value added and 
energy inputs. The nested linkages have the form of nested CES production functions, which can 
be expressed in functional form as: 
(3) 
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For each of the production nests in Figure 1, the substitution parameters (σ) are sector-specific but 
identical across regions; however, the production functions differ over regions too because the 
input share parameters (α) are sector and region specific. These share parameters are derived from 
cost shares in the input-output data in the base year (Lejour et al., 2006) with the notations in Eq. 
(3) and (4) corresponding to Figure 1. The nests at the lower levels illustrated by Figure 1 are 
analogously defined as the top-level production nest in Eq. (3). However, there is an exception. 
The value-added nest is modelled differently because it includes also the total factor productivity 
term. The labour-nest is then modelled as a Cobb-Douglas production function combining high-
skilled and low-skilled labour. 
Figure 1: Production nest in WorldScan 
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Similarly to the nested production structure above, the cost function is also nested. Total 
production costs are defined for each firm as: 
(5)    s h l f f
f
sr s s S S L L CPE FIX f q p q ,...,      where , , , ,   with   , 1 = = ∑ =
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Where Pf  denotes the price of input f, which denotes either fixed factor (FIX), capital (CPE), low-
skilled labour (Ll), high-skilled labour (Lh) or inputs from all other sectors (S=s1,…,ss). Equations 
(6) and (7) below illustrate the nested unit cost structure for the upper levels of the nested function 
in Figure 1, expressed as: 
(6) 
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Note that the price of value added is a CES aggregate of the price of labour and the price of 
capital, while the price of labour is a Cobb-Douglas aggregate of the wages for high- and low-
skilled labour. Capital costs are equal to the real return on capital (k), compensation for risk (o) 





β γ ) ( − ∏ =
. The price of the 
composite intermediate goods is a CES aggregate of the prices of the underlying intermediates. 
This is also true for the energy input. 
3.2.2. Sectoral Consumption Demand System 
Sectoral disaggregation is considered also for the demand side in the model. The equations for the 
demand for goods and services, including energy categories, correspond to the production 
classification and are described by a sectoral consumption system. Production equals total 
demand which consists of consumer demand, intermediate demand, investment demand and 
exports. For illustration purposes, we summarize only the consumer demand below derived from 
WorldScan as described by Lejour et al. (2006).
27 
The main difference from the production system is that a non-homogeneous demand system is 
used for the modelling of consumer demand rather than a homogeneous CES system. The main 
reason is that an income elasticity of one under the CES system is inconsistent with the empirical 
consumption literature. The established fact is that the budget share spent on necessary goods 
becomes smaller with rising income, while the share spent on luxury goods becomes large. From 
the range of different modelling possibilities, WorldScan applies the linear expenditure systems 
(LES) derived from the Stone-Geary utility function due to its simplicity in modelling and 
interpretation (see Neary, 1997). Hence, the overall utility of consumer c  is defined as 
, where ccj is consumption of good j by consumer c and (γcj) is a parameter 
representing committed consumption of good j. A positive value of γcj allows the interpretation of 
a subsistence level or the minimal quantity of consumption of good j needed to survive.
28 If all 
subsistence levels are satisfied, the remaining budget (Yc- γcj) is distributed over the consumption 
goods according to their marginal budget shares βj that have unit sum. The utility function gives 
rise to a linear demand system, in which the individual demand function is expressed as: 











γ ∑ − + =
                                                
 
 
27The documentation by Lejour et al. (2006) provides further insights into intermediate and investment demand systems. 
Production factor demand is determined by the cost-share parameter, the output at the higher nest level, the price ratio and 
the substitution parameters. 
28For 0 = cj γ  , the Stone-Geary function reduces to a Cobb-Douglas utility function.                  European Economy - Economic Papers  No 406 
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where total consumption of all goods j at the user price purchased by consumer c  is  
. The aggregate demand equation is then defined as , which sums 













3.3. Climate Change Policy 
3.3.1. Emission Price 
The model distinguishes between exogenous and endogenous changes in emissions. On the one 
hand, the exogenous changes are not influenced by a climate policy, but are rather associated with 
other considerations, such as technological improvements. These are captured in the model by 
technical coefficients that are called autonomous energy efficiency improvements (AEEIs), which 
reflect the rate of change in energy intensity holding energy prices constant.
29 On the other hand, 
the endogenous changes are related to climate policy instruments and energy prices. An important 
instrument is the emission price charged to emitters for their emissions. The economic rationale 
behind this concept is to shift demand from more to less polluting sources of energy.
30 




Consider the carbon tax rate   in terms of the revenues of emitting ( ) and the value of fuel 
use ( ), which is defined as an ad valorem tax rate in the form of a mark-up on the market price 
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where the amount of fuels qf is sold at the market (m) price of fuels  . The carbon tax rate ( ) 
depends on the magnitude of the fuel-specific emission factor ( ), which differs according to 







31 Producers and 
consumers pay an emission price ( ) in US$ per tons of carbon equivalents (US$/tCeq) for the 
emissions ( ) resulting from the fossil fuel use, i.e. the production inputs (f) in this case include 
coal, natural gas and petroleum products. The revenues ( ) are returned to the regional 
households in a lump-sum fashion: 
E
f q






f     where , =
The actual user prices, which producers (p) and consumers (p
c) pay for the use of economic goods 
are then defined as: 
(11)   
(12)   
 
29The AEEIs are calibrated to the energy usage projected by an exogenous baseline. In adopting efficiency improvements 
in the WorldScan baseline an elasticity of substitution between fuel use and capital inputs is assumed of 0.5. 
30For example, the carbon price raises the user price of fossil fuels and lowers the amount of emissions for the case of 
carbon dioxide related emissions. For the case of other GHG, the emission price raises the output price for the emission 
sectors and consequently lowers their demand and results in lower levels of GHG. 
31The revenues R
E are nil for the alternative fuels that do not emit carbon dioxide. 
  
where the market (m) price for fossil fuels ( ) is equal for producers and consumers, a tax on 
carbon emissions is  , a tax on fuel inputs for production process is   and a fuel consumption 
tax is  . The emission price itself does not depend on the specific fuel, but the tax rate does. The 
modelling of the carbon emissions price as a carbon tax increasing the user fuel price generates 
the following economic effects. First, the demand for energy by producers falls, resulting in a 
lower energy intensity for a region with a higher carbon tax. Second, the energy use switches 
from fossil fuel to less carbon intensive energy carriers. Third, the sector specialization shifts 
towards lower energy intensity. Finally, the climate policy may generate spillovers in terms of 




f t f t
c
f t
3.3.2. Emission Targets and Trading of Permits 
The following two cases demonstrate how the emission volume targets are modelled in 
WorldScan. Building upon the previous sub-section, consider that a climate policy uses the price 
instrument for achieving the emissions-level target either domestically or internationally by 
permit trading. 
In the first case without trade, the regions have to meet their individual targets (
E
r q ) domestically. 
Equation (13) below total emissions from the relevant sectors s in country r will meet the target 











r p q q  
In the second case with trade, regions can purchase and sell emission permits on the international 
permit market. Hence, the individual regions can adjust their abatement efforts by trading 
emission permits. The implicit equation for the emissions price of coalition is: 
0 p










  (14) 
All regions within the abatement coalition share a joint emissions-volume target (
E
q ) and a 
uniform emissions price ( ). The joint target is the sum of emission target allocations at the 
country level. The regions may differ in their reduction efforts because of production technology 
differences, for example, due to differences in sectoral energy efficiency. Their income from 
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For the exporters of emissions permits, this income Y will be positive and it will be negative for 
the importers of emissions permits. Trade is beneficial for the welfare of all participating regions 
due to marginal abatement costs (MAC) differentials. The regions with higher MAC will purchase 





32The symbol ⊥ denotes orthogonality, x≥0 ⊥y≥0 implying x≥0 , y≥0  and xy = 0. 
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3.3.3. The Clean Development Mechanism 
Recall from the previous sub-section that each sector is represented by a profit maximizing firm, 




















produced with inputs (f). The subscripts denoting sectors (s) and regions (r) are henceforth 
omitted for clarity reasons. Consider now that a firm has the opportunity to contribute to the CDM 
at a given CDM-price π and that the volume contribution at unit output is represented by z. The 
unit cost minimization problem therefore includes an additional term z denoting certificate sales 
to the CDM system, and can be expressed as: 
(16)  z q w w c f f
f
π π − = ∑ min ) , (  
0 = zs
1 ) (

























Here wf denotes the price of input f and qf the volume of the input used per unit of output. The 
variable z measures the excess of a benchmark for per-unit emissions z
* over and above emissions 
∑
f
f fq β at unit output.  When the CDM price π falls short of generating a positive CDM supply, a 
slack variable s is used to set CDM supply z to zero. There are two alternative solutions, that is, 
one with   and the other with  . Assuming the solutions are strictly internal at these two 
points, the CDM supply (z) will be strictly positive, if the slack (s) is nil. By contrast, if the CDM 
supply (z) is nil, then the slack (s) will be strictly positive so that the solution becomes identical to 
cost minimization without the CDM constraint. When the optimal solution of (16) yields a 
positive z one may derive that in equilibrium: 
0 = z 0 = s
 (17)  σ σ πβ α β π − − ∑ ∑ + + + − = 1
1
1 ) ) ( ( ) ( f f f f f w q z p
f f
 
Equation (17) says that in the optimum of a CDM-supplying firm the inputs f are ‘virtually’ taxed 
with  f πβ to drive down emissions while the firm receives a subsidy per unit of output that is the 
sum of the value of the CDM contribution (πz) and the virtual tax burden  ∑
f
f f q β π . Hence, in 
WorldScan a CDM-supplying firm is fully reimbursed for its abatement costs while the receipts of 
CDM-sales do not translate into profits (which are absent under perfect competition) but into a 
lower output price. 
4. Model-Based Analysis 
4.1. Baseline Specification 
Before turning to the simulation results, it is useful to discuss the underlying assumptions because 
the cost estimates depend on the assumptions about the baseline and climate policy trajectories. 
The baseline reflects the business-as-usual scenario, which is updated to the latest GTAP-7 data 
using 2004 as a starting year in the analysis. All counterfactual analyses depart from a so-called 
middle-course scenario without a climate policy that has been developed by the Netherlands 
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Environmental Assessment Agency (PBL). This scenario is based on the estimates of trends, and 
is comparable to the reference scenario used by the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the 
so-called B2 scenario used by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). 
Table 1. Characteristics of baseline scenario, average annual growth, 2004-2020
CO2 emissions GDP volume Population Real wage Energy demand
2004-2020 (%) 2004-2020 (%) 2004-2020 (%) 2004-2020 (%) 2004-2020 (%)
A n n e x  I 0 . 9 32 . 4 50 . 3 82 . 2 81 . 2 3
  EU27 1.27 2.41 0.05 2.63 1.60
  EU15 1.16 2.27 0.11 2.46 1.43
  EU12 1.76 4.55 -0.16 4.88 2.47
  USA 0.09 2.28 0.93 1.53 0.21
  Former Soviet Union 2.51 6.63 -0.26 7.02 3.05
N o n - A n n e x  I 4 . 5 56 . 3 71 . 2 25 . 1 34 . 9 5
  Brazil -0.90 3.50 1.13 2.36 0.11
  China 4.15 9.41 0.53 9.23 4.43
  India 5.83 7.32 1.44 5.23 6.33
W o r l d 2 . 7 43 . 3 31 . 0 62 . 0 33 . 0 3
Source: Baseline scenario, the WorldScan climate change model.  
Table 1 presents the main characteristics of the baseline scenario for the period 2004-2020. 
Combined with worldwide economic growth of around 3.3% per year, the global demand for 
energy will increase significantly by about half in 2020 relative to 2004 with an average annual 
growth of 3.0%, notably in non-Annex I countries (5.0%). Carbon dioxide emissions are expected 
to increase more in non-Annex I countries (4.5%) than in Annex I countries (1.0%), except for 
Brazil (-0.9%). The baseline scenario described in Table 1 considers the evolution of the world's 
economic growth without the current financial crisis. As shown by Figure 2, this baseline 
therefore assumes a normal evolution of economic activity after 2007, captured by the series of 
real GDP growth rates explained in more detail in Annex. This assumption is relaxed further in 
the paper, where the current financial crisis is explicitly considered in the baseline scenario. 
Source: WorldScan computations based on the Euoropean Commission (2009d and 2009e) and IMF (2009) forecast reports until 2008 and own
computations afterwards.
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The climate change version of WorldScan is calibrated to a climate policy-free energy baseline 
from the Timer model based on data provided by the Dutch Environmental Assessment Agency 
(PBL). In particular, the baseline considers exogenous real GDP growth calibrated to the sectoral 
level by adjusting total factor productivities, exogenous energy use by using energy efficiency 
adjustments and compensating capital requirements, and exogenous prices of primary energy 
carriers by using energy resources.
33 
4.2. Policy Scenarios 
The objective of different policy scenarios is to demonstrate the limitations of the existing carbon 
market mechanisms and to assess the cost-efficiency of sectoral approaches and greater 
participation of developing countries. The following reasoning guides the selection of the policy 
scenarios. The EU's advocacy of sectoral mechanisms is based on the need (i) to address problems 
in ensuring the additionality of CDM credits, (ii) to scale up the international carbon market, in 
line with the need to achieve substantially increased volumes of emission reductions cost-
effectively in the post-2012 period, and importantly (iii) to incentivise a transition from pure 
offsetting to cap-and-trade in major advanced developing countries.
34 A sectoral approach, rather 
than the project-by-project approach of the CDM, may help to deliver these goals. By establishing 
a target for sectoral emissions that goes beyond the business-as-usual outcomes, and that should 
be achieved before emission reductions are eligible for the international carbon market, it should 
induce action in advanced developing countries while largely ensuring that only genuine emission 
reductions can be offset against developed country emissions. At the same time, by eliminating 
the bottleneck of the CDM project approval procedures, it should facilitate the supply of emission 
reductions to the carbon market. 
Table 2. Overview of policy scenarios
Annex I Non-Annex I
Common emissions trading system (CTS) Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)
No action
No sectoral approaches
Annex I Non-Annex I
Common emissions trading system (CTS) Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)
Action: Emissions tax at 50% of CTS-price
No sectoral approaches
Annex I Non-Annex I
Common emissions trading system (CTS) Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)
S3: SECTORAL APPROACHES
S1: GLOBAL CARBON MARKET
Common emissions trading system (CTS), no CDM
Intermediate step
S2: ENHANCED PARTICIPATION OF NON-ANNEX I
Action: Emissions tax at 50% of CTS-price
Sectoral approaches: Emissions tax at 90% of the CTS-
price in the power sector
 
In our analysis, it is therefore assumed that a common emissions trading system (CTS) covering 
all their greenhouse gas emissions is established among Annex I countries. The non-Annex I 
countries will not altogether abolish the existing CDM, but will instead enhance their own 
                                                 
33Energy prices in the baseline differ from current prices, so that the oil price amounts to about 30 $/barrel in 2020, which 
potentially leads to lower financial flows if the oil price is under-estimated. A future extension of the baseline taking 
account of a higher oil price of about 60 $/barrel might be appropriate.  
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34 The choice of our policy scenarios is motivated also by the previous work of European Commission (see e.g. European 
Commission, 2009a and 2009b). Large differences in the marginal abatement costs between countries and sectors are the 
key driver for the creation of market-based mechanisms that eventually lead to cost-efficient reductions of emissions. 
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participation amounting to about half of the effort of Annex I countries in terms of abatement 
costs per unit of emissions. In addition, the existing project-based CDM will be augmented by 
sector-based approaches in non-Annex I countries. The global carbon market (GCM) scenario 
represents a cost-effective benchmark case against which we compare the counterfactual 
scenarios entailing different alternatives to the current CDM. All scenarios assume that no use is 
made of excess Assigned Amount Units issued under the first commitment period of the Kyoto 
Protocol to meet emission reduction commitments after 2012. 
Table 2 summarizes schematically the main modelling assumptions across different 
counterfactual scenarios. All scenarios consider that the Kyoto Protocol remains in place until 
2012, which includes the EU Emissions Trading System. In the post-2012 regime, the Annex I 
countries form a coalition and agree to similar mitigation efforts within a common emissions 
trading system (henceforth, we consider the abbreviation CTS for common trading system). A 
distinguishing point is that we consider different policy options for non-Annex I countries by 
gradually increasing their abatement effort and introducing the sectoral crediting mechanism for 
the power sector in the third scenario. 
Scenario 1 assumes the creation of a perfect global carbon market by 2013, implying that 
marginal abatement costs are equalized in all countries so that global abatement costs are 
minimized. The CDM is no longer in place as all countries can trade freely in emission permits 
within a common trading system. As shown in Table 2, we consider an intermediate scenario 
before turning to the assessment of own participation and sectoral approaches in the non-Annex I 
countries. The intermediate scenario facilitates the assessment of the current CDM as it assumes 
that non-Annex I countries keep the CDM in its present project-based form. 
Scenario 2 assesses the possibility of a developing country's own participation in financing 
domestic programmes to reduce emissions. The Annex I countries participate in a common 
trading system, but the non-Annex I countries have to provide a fraction of their own funds from 
public transfers in order to become eligible for receiving the CDM transfers. This scenario is 
modelled in a two-step fashion. In the first step, we define a "do-something" baseline in terms of 
emissions per unit of sectoral outputs in the CDM-supplying countries. In the second step, we 
take only reductions below this baseline as eligible for the CDM-credit exports. The production 
sectors in the non-Annex I countries are thus not covered by the CTS but instead supply the 
credits to the CDM scheme. The non-Annex I countries take half of the effort of the Annex I 
countries since the second baseline is determined by an emission tax imposed in non-Annex I 
countries, which is equal to 50% of the common trading system price. 
Finally, Scenario 3 assesses the potential of sectoral approaches compared to the existing project-
by-project crediting mechanisms. The sectoral credits are only issued for the reductions in 
emissions that go beyond an agreed threshold represented by this second baseline. As in scenario 
2, the non-Annex I countries enhance their participation by taking half as much effort as Annex I 
countries. In addition to scenario 2, the non-Annex I countries impose a carbon tax in the power 
sector at 90% of the CTS price, which shifts the second baseline for the power sector downwards 
relative to other sectors. 
The power sector is chosen somewhat arbitrarily to demonstrate the impact of sectoral 
approaches. However, arguments can be found in favour of this choice. First of all, the electricity 
sector is a significant and increasingly important contributor to global greenhouse gases (GHG) 
emissions. Together with the heating sector it accounts for about one quarter of total GHG 
(Bradley et al., 2007). Besides that, this sector is considerably abundant with financial means in 
most countries of the world. It is one of the sectors with considerably large technical potential for 
emissions reductions and thus low-cost abatement opportunities (Baron and Elis, 2006; Burniaux, 
2009). Abatement of emissions in the power sector will be crucial in developing countries, as 
developing countries gradually increase demand for energy and represent almost half of the 
expected growth in global CO2 emissions on a business-as-usual basis. For example, China's 
power sector accounts for about half of this total and India's power sector represents 
approximately one quarter of it (IEA, 2009). A possible economic intuition underlying the 
analysis of sectoral approaches in the electricity sector is that sectoral incentives for electricity                  European Economy - Economic Papers  No 406 
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restructuring towards greater efficiency are needed to achieve environmentally effective 
outcomes. The sectoral crediting mechanisms could offer one of the vehicles to induce changes in 
the electricity sector by facilitating targeted public and private investments. 
4.3. Assumptions Underlying Policy Scenarios 
In all policy scenarios the emission pledge for the EU27 is set at 20% reduction below 1990 
emission levels by 2020. This working assumption is in line with the Commission communication 
to the European Parliament on "20 20 by 2020" (European Commission, 2008), which among 
others specifies that the EU commits to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at least 20% by 2020 
and to ensure that 20% of final energy consumption is met with renewable sources. For modelling 
purposes, the pledges are transformed into quantitative emission ceilings compared to 2005. The 
quantitative ceiling is calculated as the percentage change from 2005 emission reductions by 2020 
taking into account the reduction pledges with respect to 1990 emission levels. For example, for 
the 20% reduction target of the EU with respect to 1990 emissions we arrive at a reduction of 
14% compared to 2005 emissions.
35 Comparable to our calculations, Levin and Bradley (2009) 
consider also a quantitative ceiling for the EU27 at -14% compared to 2005 for the EU27 20% 
reduction while Wagner and Amman (2009) establish the quantitative ceiling for the EU27 at        
-13% compared to 2005 for the EU27 20% reduction target. The pledges for the emission 
reductions by non-EU27 Annex I countries are uniformly set at 20% in 2020 compared to 2005 
levels. The target for developing countries is set at a 15% emission reduction below the baseline 
in 2020. 
The renewable targets are specified in the model according to the "20 20 by 2020" initiative 
(European Commission, 2008) by which 20% of final energy consumption is met with renewable 
sources by 2020. In the model, we first calculate the 20% renewable target in volume terms 
assuming that Member States unilaterally commit to a pledge of 20% cut compared to 1990 
emission levels, as defined in the "20 20 by 2020" initiative. The renewable targets expressed in 
volume terms are then applied to all our policy scenarios. The reason for this uniform treatment of 
renewable targets in all scenarios is that the model assumes progressive marginal costs of 
renewable energy carriers. Given that mitigation operates by substitution of heavily-polluting 
energy carriers by less-polluting energy carriers, a consideration of renewable targets 
endogenously with the energy use in each scenario would generate implausible income losses for 
the EU. 
5. Outcomes of the Analysis 
5.1. Simulation Results 
The presentation of simulation results follows the objective of this paper and brings into focus the 
environmental effectiveness, cost-efficiency and macro-economic impacts of different climate 
policy options. The results are typically expressed as percentages of baseline values in 2020.
36 
Table 3 presents the results of counterfactual policy scenarios against the benchmark global 
carbon market (GCM) scenario. 
  16 
                                                 
35The ceiling considers a uniform target for the ETS sectors and the country-specific targets for the non-ETS sectors for 
the pledge of 20% (see Table A2 in Annex for detailed information), which are based on the official document by the 
European Union (2009a). As stated in this document, the reduction efforts by the EU Members are based on the principle 
of solidarity between Member States and the need for sustainable economic growth across the EU, so that Members with 
relatively low per capita GDP and high growth expectations may increase their GHG emissions compared to 2005.  The 
quantitative ceilings are calculated separately for the ETS and non-ETS sectors, by taking into account the pledges and 
emission volumes, and then summed up together to define an aggregate quantitative. 
36Alternatively, the model also allows assessing the effects in levels. The results are presented for a selected set of 
countries for 2020, but all results could be also derived either at annual, country or sector level for sets of individual 
countries and country groups. 
  
Table 3. Emissions reduction and macro-conomic costs of different policy options
Permit price
Emissions GDP p.c. Emissions GDP p.c. Emissions GDP p.c. (€ / tCO2)
Global carbon market -17.97 -0.17 -27.73 -0.84 -23.64 -0.37 19.86
CDM in non-Annex I -12.16 -0.17 -12.27 -0.13 -12.23 -0.16 10.57
Own participation of non-Annex I -15.20 -0.22 -21.73 -0.44 -18.99 -0.28 14.56
Sectoral approaches in non-Annex I -15.94 -0.23 -23.81 -0.53 -20.51 -0.31 15.63
Annex I Non-Annex I World
Note: Emissions and GDP p.c. are reported in % baseline deviation. Emission price in 2020 is reported in EUR per ton of CO2.
Source: WorldScan computations.  
Exempting production sectors in non-Annex I countries from the CTS leads to a global reduction 
of emissions of 12% relative to baseline level in 2020. This is considerable less than under the 
global carbon market scenario (-24%). The CDM use allows Annex-I countries to meet their 
reduction targets at considerably lower CTS permit price (11 €/tCO2) than under the global carbon 
market (GCM) (20 €/tCO2). Although environmentally ineffective compared to the GCM, the 
CDM is less costly for non-Annex I countries in terms of GDP (-0.1%) compared to the GCM (-
0.8%). While own participation raises the abatement effort of non-Annex I countries, it 
simultaneously increases the action of Annex I countries because of their reduced opportunities to 
rely upon the CDM. By contrast, the non-Annex I countries achieve large environmental gains (-
22%) at moderate economic costs in terms of GDP (-0.4%). The emission reduction of almost 
24% under the sectoral crediting mechanisms comes close to the emission reductions in non-
Annex I countries under the global carbon market (-28%). Intuitively, the imposition of a 
relatively high carbon tax in the power sector yields a considerable reduction of emissions as the 
power sector is one of the main culprits for carbon dioxide emissions in non-Annex I countries. 
Figure 3 plots the carbon emissions reduction over time and shows that all three scenarios are 
environmentally superior to the CDM regime. It becomes clear from Figure 3 that the costly effort 
of developing countries is justified on environmental grounds. A further extension towards a 
system with the new sectoral approaches in the non-Annex I countries is almost as 
environmentally effective as the global carbon market already when the sectoral approaches are 


















































































































CDM in non-Annex 1
Own participation of non-Annex I
Sectoral approaches in non-Annex I
Global carbon market
Figure 3. Global reduction of emissions comparing different policy options
 
Table 4 gives further insights by comparing the Annex I countries allowance imports across 
different policy options. The policy option in the third row of Table 4 considers that all sectors in 
Annex I countries are part of a common emissions trading system, but the production sectors in 
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non-Annex I countries are a source of CDM credits. The CDM appears to be ineffective with 
higher emission levels in Annex I countries (14.5 GtCO2) and non-Annex I countries (20.0 
GtCO2) relative to the counterfactual scenarios that improve upon the existing CDM by assuming 
own participation and the SCM in non-Annex I countries. That is, the higher the own effort of 
non-Annex I countries, the higher the benefits for climate change. Both variants push CDM use to 
the margin because they shift downwards the CDM benchmark. Both Annex I countries and non-
Annex I countries gain in economic terms from the CDM system at the expense of the 
environment. The enhanced participation of non-Annex I countries results in a fall of CDM 
imports from 2.5 to 1.9 GtCO2. An additional consideration of sectoral mechanisms in the power 
sector of non-Annex I countries reduces further CDM use to 1.7 GtCO2 and reduces emissions 
from 14.0 to 13.8 GtCO2. Stimulating own participation in developing countries leads to further 
action in the industrialized countries, simply because of reduced trading opportunities under the 
CDM. 






Baseline 39.2 16.5 22.8 ---
Global carbon market 30.0 13.5 16.5 1.6 1.6 -
CDM in non-Annex I 34.4 14.5 20.0 2.6 0.1 2.5
Own participation of non-Annex I 31.8 14.0 17.8 2.1 0.2 1.9




5.2. The Volume of the Financial Flows through the Carbon Market 
The total financial flows through the carbon market amount roughly to €32 billion at 2004 prices, 
as shown in Table 5. At the global level, the order of magnitude is comparable across different 
policy scenarios. Moving from the CDM through the sectoral approaches towards the global 
carbon market gradually increases the financial flows. Table 5 presents the financial flows for 
individual Annex I countries and non-Annex I countries. Column (1) of Table 5 refers to the 
reference scenario 1 assuming the global carbon market, where all Annex I and non-Annex I 
sectors take part in the common emissions trading system. The bulk of financial transfers come 
from the EU27 (€13 billion), while China is the largest recipient of the funds (€28 billion). The 
financial transfers from the carbon market for China are substantially lower under the other 
scenarios. 
Table 5. International financial flows through the carbon market in 2020
Global carbon 
market








( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )
Annex I -32.2 -27.2 -30.2 -30.5
  EU27 -13.3 -9.4 -11.2 -11.6
  EU15 -13.6 -8.9 -11.0 -11.5
  EU12 0.3 -0.5 -0.2 -0.1
  USA 2.0 -3.2 -1.5 -0.8
  Former Soviet Union -9.1 -6.5 -7.8 -8.1
Non-Annex I 32.2 27.2 30.2 30.5
  Brazil 4.9 1.2 1.5 1.6
  China 28.0 10.8 11.0 11.1
  India -0.5 4.5 3.6 3.2
  18 
Source: WorldScan computations.
Note: Financial flows are reported in billion EUR at 2004 prices.
 
  
5.3. The Global Carbon Market 
Scenario 1 is a reference policy scenario, which is modelled against the background of the 
baseline with no consideration of the current financial crisis. In a nutshell, this scenario considers 
the Kyoto Protocol continuously in place until 2012 and a perfect global carbon market in the 
post-2012 period.  
Table 6 gives a detailed overview of the environmental and economic effects for individual 
countries. The outcomes of the global carbon market scenario show an emission reduction of        
-18% compared to the baseline in 2020, which comes at 0.3% loss in national income in Annex I 
countries. In addition to more standard measures of economic activities like GDP and national 
income, the second column of Table 6 reports the welfare effects. The welfare measure includes 
consumption and leisure activity. The magnitude of economic effects in terms of welfare comes 
close to the national income effects in most economies, except for the new EU Member States and 
emerging countries. However, regardless of the measure of economic activity used, the economic 
cost at the global level approaches -0.37% relative to the baseline in 2020.  
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Souce: WorldScan computations.
Note: The results are reported as % deviation from baseline in 2020. 












Annex I -17.97 -0.29 -0.17 -0.27 -0.55 -0.73 -1.34
  EU27 -15.09 -0.28 -0.13 -0.30 -0.35 -0.52 -1.30
  EU15 -13.73 -0.26 -0.10 -0.28 -0.28 -0.39 -1.36
  EU12 -20.79 -0.44 -0.55 -0.57 -1.33 -1.23 -0.94
  USA -20.85 -0.16 -0.12 -0.13 -0.59 -1.74 -1.29
  Former Soviet Union -21.16 -1.85 -0.99 -1.41 -3.29 -1.04 -4.59
Non-Annex I -27.73 -0.58 -0.84 -0.57 -2.53 -2.64 -1.69
  China -31.28 -0.32 -0.70 -0.18 -2.58 -3.09 -0.93
  India -33.10 -0.86 -1.12 -1.10 -3.42 -4.07 -2.43
  Brazil -23.11 0.38 -0.17 0.27 -0.46 -4.87 -1.24
World -23.64 -0.36 -0.37 -0.36 -1.00 -1.54 -1.47
 
The non-Annex I countries appear to have a considerably larger scope for environmental 
improvements in the global carbon market compared to the project-based CDM (see Table 6 and 
Table 7). In particular, the emission reductions in non-Annex I countries (-12%) reach less than 
one half of the potential (-28%) of the global carbon market. Looking at the cross-regional 
differences, two systematic patterns seen in the global carbon scenario hold also in counterfactual 
policy scenarios. First, the order of magnitude of economic costs depends on the type of indicator 
used to assess the cost-efficiency of policies. For example in China, the abatement action costs 
0.7% of GDP, while it leads to a considerably lower welfare loss (0.3%) and income loss (0.2%) 
in the global carbon market scenario (Table 6). Second, the abatement action appears to be 
relatively more costly in the new Member States (EU12) than in the old Member States (EU15), 
which is likely associated with the relative carbon-intensity of their industries.  
A possible explanation for these two observations is the following. With regard to the choice of a 
cost measure, a loss of GDP indicates reduced production, while the welfare indicator is linked 
more closely to national income than to production as consumer expenditure is simply determined 
as a fraction of the former. The changing wedges between income and production value result in 
trade adjustments, which are presented in the last two columns of Table 6. In the global carbon  
market scenario, imports have decreased by less than exports in non-Annex I countries, 
respectively by -1.7% and -2.6% relative to the baseline, while the opposite is observed for the 
Annex I countries, where exports have on average declined by far less (-0.7%) than imports         
(-1.3%). These results imply that the financial transfers from Annex I countries to non-Annex I 
countries are partly spent on imports from Annex I countries.                  European Economy - Economic Papers  No 406 
                 Options for International Financing of Climate Change Mitigation in Developing Countries 
 












Annex I -12.16 -0.20 -0.17 -0.20 -0.35 -0.56 -0.71
  EU27 -10.54 -0.23 -0.20 -0.26 -0.20 -0.44 -0.66
  EU15 -9.61 -0.21 -0.18 -0.24 -0.17 -0.38 -0.66
  EU12 -14.40 -0.43 -0.49 -0.54 -0.75 -0.76 -0.69
  USA -14.00 -0.11 -0.11 -0.10 -0.37 -1.06 -0.63
  Former Soviet Union -13.79 -0.98 -0.28 -0.50 -1.80 0.29 -2.27
Non-Annex I -12.27 -0.06 -0.13 -0.02 -0.14 -0.82 -0.49
  China -16.08 -0.02 -0.08 0.02 -0.17 -0.80 -0.37
  India -17.32 0.07 -0.15 0.08 -0.12 -1.35 0.28
  Brazil -12.43 0.12 -0.13 -0.11 0.02 -1.53 0.08
World -12.23 -0.16 -0.16 -0.15 -0.31 -0.68 -0.62
Souce: WorldScan computations.
Note: The results are reported as % deviation from baseline in 2020.
 
With regard to the differences between the new Member States and the old Member States, 
relatively more costly abatement actions could be due to the relative carbon-intensity of industries 
in the new Member States. To understand better this wedge between the EU12 and the EU15, we 
look for further sector-specific evidence in Table 8. The EU12 countries are more carbon-
intensive in the production of electricity than the EU15 countries, since carbon-intensive coal 
represents 35% of total output in the EU12 countries. The EU15 countries instead rely more on 
carbon-extensive sources, such as natural gas (23%), nuclear plants (36%) and renewables (2%). 
The environmental policy could indirectly affect the energy-intensive manufacturing industries, if 
the environmentally constrained price of energy is streamed down the supply chain but there is 
hardly any supportive evidence of this link. For example, Convery et al. (2008) do not find any 
effect on the link between the carbon price and competitiveness in the EU looking across all 
sectors, but Bassi et al. (2009) suggest that this could be the case for some US manufacturing 
industries depending on their carbon intensity, the mix of energy sources and the energy 
efficiency of production. 
Table 8. Primary energy for electricity production, % share ot total in 2004
Coal Oil Natural gas Nuclear Wind/Solar Hydro
EU12 34.71% 4.94% 12.98% 33.92% 0.08% 13.37%
EU15 20.44% 5.25% 23.04% 36.26% 2.33% 12.68%
EU27 21.92% 5.21% 22.00% 36.01% 2.10% 12.75%
Note: The reported values are the % output share of the total primary energy used for electricity production in
Source: Eurostat (October, 2009).
2004, which is the starting year of the model.
 
The discussion of the results above highlights two issues. First, there is a large scope for 
environmental improvements in non-Annex I countries and those Annex I countries with large 
abatement possibilities, as for example the new EU Member States. The economic impact of 
abatement actions can be interpreted with a range of macro-economic cost measures. Second, the 
results highlight the need for the effort-sharing principles between high-income and low-income 
regions. In the case of the European Union, the Council has already adopted the effort-sharing 
decision by which no EU Member State should be asked to make an investment that diverges too 
far from 0.5% of GDP by 2020 (European Union, 2009a). In particular, the specific requirements 
of each Member State are to be adjusted to a realistic level of investment from lower-income 
Member States.
37 
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37The adjustment thus affects different aspects of the Commission proposals, including the national targets set for 
reductions in greenhouse gases outside the ETS (presented in Annex Table A2), the national targets set for the share of EU 
  
5.4. Enhanced Participation of Developing Countries 
Scenario 2 is a counterfactual policy scenario, which is modelled against the background of the 
baseline with no consideration of the current financial crisis. In a nutshell, Scenario 2 assesses the 
theoretical possibility of enhanced participation of developing countries, which take half as much 
of the abatement effort as Annex I countries. Table 9 presents the simulation results for individual 
Annex I and non-Annex I countries. 
Comparing the results of this policy scenario to the CDM scenario, it becomes clear that enhanced 
participation of non-Annex I countries helps to reduce global emissions (-19%) with considerable 
improvements in non-Annex I countries (-22%). At the global level, the welfare effects (-0.26%) 
resemble the economic effects in terms of GDP and national income. As expected, the economic 
costs for non-Annex I countries are somewhat lower than under the global carbon market 
scenario, because their sectors can partially benefit from the CDM. The consideration of different 
cost measures is nonetheless useful to understand better the cost-efficiency of mitigation action 
across different countries. It appears that non-Annex I countries lose relatively less in terms of 
welfare than in terms of GDP, while the estimates of national income loss come very close to the 
welfare loss estimates. Among non-Annex I countries, Brazil achieves high environmental 
improvements (-23%) at considerably lower cost (-0.2%) than India (-0.6%). 
Among Annex I countries, the new EU Member States and the US have greater scope for 
environmental improvements than the EU15. However, the US mitigation action appears to be 
less costly, since the comparable reductions of 17% are achieved at 0.1% loss in GDP in the US, 
while the EU12 lose 0.6% of GDP. Comparing different measures of cost-efficiency, the results 
imply relatively small differences across Annex I countries, while the opposite is true for non-
Annex I countries. Table 9 also presents other macro-economic results. In sum, this policy 
scenario results in considerably smaller macro-economic costs than the global carbon market 
scenario. 
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World -18.99 -0.26 -0.28 -0.27 -0.51 -1.16 -1.10
Souce: WorldScan computations.
Note: The results are reported as % deviation from baseline in 2020.












Annex I -15.20 -0.25 -0.22 -0.24 -0.47 -0.90 -1.04
  EU27 -12.99 -0.27 -0.23 -0.31 -0.31 -0.68 -0.96
  EU15 -11.85 -0.25 -0.20 -0.28 -0.26 -0.61 -0.98
  EU12 -17.79 -0.45 -0.58 -0.58 -1.05 -1.11 -0.85
  USA -17.46 -0.14 -0.14 -0.12 -0.49 -1.69 -0.97
  Former Soviet Union -17.51 -1.32 -0.56 -0.86 -2.43 -0.26 -3.20
Non-Annex I -21.73 -0.30 -0.44 -0.34 -0.60 -1.50 -1.19
  China -27.40 -0.26 -0.41 -0.32 -0.69 -1.40 -0.95
  India -28.67 -0.38 -0.61 -0.46 -1.03 -1.99 -0.76
  Brazil -23.50 0.09 -0.20 -0.18 -0.11 -2.49 -0.79
 
5.5. Sectoral Crediting Mechanisms 
Scenario 3 has been developed as a counterfactual policy scenario and is modelled against the 
background of the baseline with no consideration of the current financial crisis. In a nutshell, this 
scenario assesses the role of sectoral approaches by considering an additional tax on carbon 
emissions in the power sector of non-Annex I countries. 
                                                                                                                                     
energy consumption to be taken by renewables, and auctioning rights under the ETS with the distribution of auctioning 
rights spread to increase the share of lower-income Member States (European Commission, 2009b).                  European Economy - Economic Papers  No 406 
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A modification of the CDM with the new sectoral approaches improves further the global 
environmental outcomes relative to a consideration of enhanced participation of developing 
countries in climate change mitigation, but not as much as the global carbon market scenario. 
Table 10 presents the simulation results for the individual Annex I and non-Annex I countries. 
Compared to the scenario with enhanced mitigation efforts of non-Annex I countries, the sectoral 
approaches in non-Annex I countries reduce the global emissions (-20%) with considerable 
improvements in non-Annex I countries (-24%). At the global level, the welfare effects (-0.29%) 
come close to the economic costs in terms of GDP and national income. 
In sum, a detailed analysis of environmental and economic effects of different policy scenarios 
shows that the environmental outcome in non-Annex I countries systematically improves as more 
countries take on more ambitious targets. Market mechanisms do not result in more reduction, but 
primarily lower cost in achieving given targets. In particular, the enhanced action of non-Annex I 
countries and moreover the sectoral approaches substantially improve the environmental outcome 
of the existing CDM mechanism applied on a project-by-project basis in non-Annex I countries. 
  22 
Souce: WorldScan computations.
Note: The results are reported as % deviation from baseline in 2020.












Annex I -15.94 -0.26 -0.23 -0.25 -0.51 -0.98 -1.12
  EU27 -13.60 -0.28 -0.24 -0.32 -0.34 -0.75 -1.03
  EU15 -12.41 -0.26 -0.21 -0.29 -0.29 -0.66 -1.05
  EU12 -18.59 -0.46 -0.60 -0.59 -1.12 -1.20 -0.88
  USA -18.29 -0.14 -0.15 -0.12 -0.52 -1.85 -1.05
  Former Soviet Union -18.43 -1.41 -0.63 -0.95 -2.60 -0.38 -3.40
Non-Annex I -23.81 -0.38 -0.53 -0.44 -0.77 -1.64 -1.36
  China -29.78 -0.33 -0.50 -0.42 -0.87 -1.54 -1.08
  India -31.64 -0.54 -0.77 -0.66 -1.32 -2.11 -1.05
  Brazil -25.28 0.08 -0.22 -0.19 -0.15 -2.69 -0.98
World -20.51 -0.29 -0.31 -0.30 -0.57 -1.27 -1.20
 
6. Potential Impacts of the Current Economic Crisis 
6.1. A Baseline Adjusted by Taking into Account the Current Economic Crisis 
The current economic crisis is likely to affect the macro-economic costs of the climate-policy 
instruments. On the one hand, the crisis will cut emissions in the short run due to lower economic 
activity and energy demand. On the other hand, it may jeopardize the long-term private and public 
investments in low-carbon technologies. A greater need for liquidity by firms could flood the 
supply of emission permits and result in a lower carbon price making polluting less expensive. 
Such market imperfections would consequently reduce the financial flows generated through the 
carbon market. 
Figure 4 plots the projected evolution of economic growth across different regions based on 
recent Commission (European Commission, 2009c, 2009d) and the IMF (IMF, 2009) projections 
of the current economic crisis. The evolution of real GDP growth follows the same path as in 
Figure 4, except for the period 2008-2012 during which the crisis is projected to fade. Figure 4 
shows that the outlook for economic growth is rather optimistic as the economic crisis appears to 
have reached its turning point by late 2009. Although a high degree of uncertainty persists in the 
markets, the policy interventions have succeeded in achieving some stabilization in the financial 
system and supported economic activity (European Commission, 2009d). 
  
Source: WorldScan computations based on the Euoropean Commission (2009d and 2009e) and IMF (2009) forecast reports until 2008 and own
computations afterwards.
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The new baseline adjustments take into account the heterogeneous responses of countries to the 
crisis rather than a common baseline shift. For example, Figure 4 shows that the advanced 
economies have been hit harder than the emerging economies with presumably larger abatement 
possibilities. The current medium-term output projections are, however, on a much lower path 
than before the crisis, consistent with a permanent loss of potential output (IMF, 2009). Hence, 
Figure 4 shows that the post-crisis economic growth returns to the pre-crisis growth average 
levels. Table 11 presents the differences between the baseline with crisis and the baseline without 
the crisis projections. The average annual growth rate is lower by 0.8% points, which implies a 
loss in potential output by 2020. While population is held constant, the other environmental and 
economic parameters are systematically lower in the baseline scenario with crisis.
38 
Table 11. Difference between baseline with crisis and baseline without crisis projections (% points)
CO2 emissions GDP volume Population Real wage Energy demand
Annex I -1.02 -0.89 0.00 -0.88 -1.04
  EU27 -0.87 -0.91 0.00 -0.91 -0.88
  EU15 -0.89 -0.91 0.00 -0.90 -0.89
  EU12 -0.81 -0.99 0.00 -0.99 -0.81
  USA -0.89 -0.75 0.00 -0.76 -0.90
  Former Soviet Union -1.74 -1.79 0.00 -1.87 -1.75
Non-Annex I -0.38 -0.58 0.00 -0.61 -0.38
  Brazil -0.24 -0.35 0.00 -0.39 -0.26
  China -0.45 -0.70 0.00 -0.75 -0.46
  India -0.14 -0.30 0.00 -0.34 -0.17
World -0.67 -0.80 0.00 -0.82 -0.69
Note:Comparison between baselinescenarion with thecrisis projections and baseline scenario without the crisis projections is calculated as
the difference between average annual growth rates in 2004-2020 of baeline with crisis and baseline without crisis. Unit of observation is
Source: Baseline scenario with crisis projections, the WorldScan climate change model.
thus a percentage point. The growth rates of parametes related to economic activity of a region are systematically lower in baseline that
includes the crisis projections compared to baseline without the crisis projections.
 
 
                                                 
38In the model, total factor productivity growth rates of sectors are adjusted to arrive at the real GDP growth rate series and 
energy use is adjusted endogenously with respect to the real GDP growth series. 
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6.2. The Potential Impact of the Crisis on the Outcomes of Policy Options 
A consideration of the current economic crisis translates into lower macro-economic costs of the 
climate policy scenarios. This is due to the fact that the required reduction effort has become 
smaller in terms of the size of the reduction below baseline, because the emission targets are 
defined in terms of pre-crisis emission levels. Table 12 presents the results of counterfactual 
policy scenarios against the benchmark global carbon market scenario. These results are directly 
comparable to those of Table 3. 
The current crisis potentially reduces the impact of the climate policy instruments, as shown in 
Table 12. In particular, the crisis drives down the CTS price from 20 €/tCO2 to 12 €/tCO2 under 
the global carbon market. A similar effect is observed in the two counterfactual policy scenarios. 
As the economic effects of the financial crisis deepen, it becomes relatively cheaper to pollute. 
Such a low price is worrying for the longer term as it reduces the incentives for firms to cut back 
their emissions. The firms may postpone their investment decisions as it becomes less efficient for 
them to consider low-carbon options. 
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Source: WorldScan computations.
Note: Emissions and GDP p.c. are reported as % difference with the baseline adjusted to crisis in [1] and not adjusted in [2]. The difference between
the baseline with crisis [1] and the baseline without crisis [2] is reported in % points. With consideration of the crisis in the baseline, the scope for
emission reduction below the baseline in 2020 is lower than in the case of the baseline without the crisis projections.
Table 12. The potential impact of the economic crisis in 2020
Permit price
Emissions GDP p.c. Emissions GDP p.c. Emissions GDP p.c. (€/tCO2)
Global carbon market
  Baseline with crisis [1] -13.05 -0.12 -20.19 -0.52 -17.33 -0.25 11.78
  Baseline without crisis [2] -17.97 -0.17 -27.73 -0.84 -23.64 -0.37 19.86
  Difference [1] - [2] 4.92 0.04 7.53 0.33 6.31 0.12 -8.08
Own participation of non-Annex I
  Baseline with crisis [1] -8.93 -0.14 -14.71 -0.22 -12.39 -0.17 6.76
  Baseline without crisis [2] -15.20 -0.22 -21.73 -0.44 -18.99 -0.28 14.56
  Difference [1] - [2] 6.27 0.07 7.02 0.21 6.60 0.11 -7.80
Sectoral approaches in non-Annex I
  Baseline with crisis [1] -9.34 -0.15 -16.45 -0.27 -13.60 -0.19 7.20
  Baseline without crisis [2] -15.94 -0.23 -23.81 -0.53 -20.51 -0.31 15.63
  Difference [1] - [2] 6.60 0.08 7.36 0.26 6.91 0.12 -8.43
Annex I Non-Annex I World
 
The crisis influences the effectiveness of policy options differently across the Annex I and non-
Annex I countries, because the adjusted baseline considers the emission targets defined in terms 
of pre-crisis emission levels. The economic costs in the Annex I countries do not depend much on 
the baseline, that is, the difference between both cases is less than 0.1% point in terms of GDP per 
capita (column 2 in Table 12). By contrast, the crisis matters more for the non-Annex I countries 
in terms of cost-efficiency as indicated by the difference between both cases in the order of 0.3% 
points for GDP (column 4 in Table 12). 
Figure 4 illustrates the heterogeneous impact of the crisis on the non-Annex I and Annex I 
countries. The crisis could have additionally affected the windfall profits of the non-Annex I 
countries. Although these countries partially still benefit from the CDM system, their benefits 
from it could be reduced due to a lower price wedge between the CTS price and the carbon tax 
rate.
39 The lower CTS price also drives down the financial flows generated through the carbon 
market. Their order of magnitude at the global level is considerably lower (€9 billion) in the case 
of the baseline scenario taking into account the crisis (Table 13). 
                                                 
39The non-Annex I countries could still exploit the price wedge of 6 €/tCO2 between the CTS price (12 €/tCO2) and the 
carbon tax set at the half of the CTS price under the global carbon market. However, the CTS price is higher (20 €/tCO2) 
in the absence of crisis, which implies a relatively higher price wedge of 10 €/tCO2 and thus higher potential profits in the 












( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )
Annex I -9.0 -8.4 -9.2 -9.4
  EU27 -5.1 -3.3 -3.8 -4.0
  EU15 -5.6 -3.2 -3.8 -4.0
  EU12 0.5 -0.1 0.0 0.0
  USA 3.6 -0.3 0.3 0.5
  Former Soviet Union -3.2 -2.1 -2.4 -2.5
Non-Annex I 9.0 8.4 9.2 9.4
  Brazil 2.8 0.5 0.6 0.7
  China 12.5 2.7 2.8 2.8
  India -2.2 1.4 1.2 1.0
Source: WorldScan computations.
Note: Financial flows are reported in billion EUR at 2004 prices.
Table 13. International financial flows in 2020 through the carbon market with a
consideration of the crisis in baseline
 
Under the Copenhagen Accord, developed countries committed themselves to a goal of 
mobilising up to $100 billion (€80 billion at 2004 prices) per year by 2020. This figure covers 
public and private finance for mitigation and adaptation, whereas our estimates of financial flows 
through the carbon market cover only private finance for mitigation.
40 The actual level of 
financial flows from developed to developing countries will depend on the level of action by 
developed and developing countries.
  
7. Conclusion 
This paper has provided some insights into the post-2012 options for the global financing of 
climate change mitigation. The modelling exercise in this paper focuses on new crediting 
mechanisms by providing an assessment of the theoretical potential of sectoral approaches and 
participation of developing countries in financing climate change actions compared to the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) projects. The analysis provides a crude estimate of carbon 
market financial flows needed for global climate change mitigation, while evaluating the 
environmental effectiveness, cost efficiency and macro-economic impacts of underlying policy 
instruments. Following the outcome of the UNFCCC conference in Copenhagen, the paper makes 
no specific assumptions about the future international climate regime. However, it assumes that 
no use is made of excess Assigned Amount Units issued under the first commitment period of the 
Kyoto Protocol to meet emission reduction commitments after 2012. 
A detailed analysis of the environmental and economic effects of different policy scenarios shows 
that the environmental prospects in non-Annex I countries systematically improve in a transition 
from the CDM towards the global carbon market, while the opposite is foreseen for their 
economic costs. The largest global emission reductions of about 24% in 2020 are achieved under 
the global emission trading system at the cost of 0.3% global income. The international financial 
transfers to developing countries would under this scenario amount to a tentative €32 billion. The 
benefits in terms of reduced global emissions with respect to the baseline range from 12% under 
the existing CDM to 19% with enhanced participation of developing countries and 20% with the 
sectoral approaches in developing countries. 
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In particular, the results suggest that the more of a carbon market we have when moving from the 
project-based CDM to sectoral crediting mechanisms and internationally linked cap-and-trade, the 
more private finance the carbon market will channel to developing countries. The improved 
environmental outcome comes foremost from enhanced participation of developing countries that 
start to take on targets and hence the carbon price leads to reductions above and beyond the own 
action. The analysis also shows that the crisis is associated with lower costs of the climate policy 
options. The latter results in a lower carbon price and reduced financial flows generated through 
the carbon market. The baseline adjusted by taking into account the crisis is lower than the pre-
crisis baseline, because the emission targets are defined in terms of pre-crisis emission levels. 
Although rather indicative and economically intuitive, these results have to be interpreted with 
caution by taking into account the assumptions adopted in the scenarios. 
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ANNEX A: Data Sources 
In specific modelling blocks, the model employs other sources than the GTAP-7 (Narayanan and 
Walmsley, 2008). The energy baseline, for example, is supplied by the Netherlands 
Environmental Assessment Agency (PBL), providing energy use by carrier and carrier prices. The 
description of data in different modelling blocks is derived from the WorldScan climate change 
model, which is supported by the CPB document describing the model (Lejour et al., 2006). 
Note that all prices in the GTAP-7 database are expressed in US dollars. The values of GDP in 
national currencies are translated into US dollars by using market exchange rates, because the 
GTAP-7 database highlights international trade relations, and trade values are always expressed in 
the US dollars using market exchange rates. GDP values in market prices are not a good indicator 
for purchase power comparisons, because non tradable goods and services are differently priced 
in the various regions. By consequence, GDP developments of various regions can not be used for 
purchase power comparisons. 
Concordance Matrix 
The GTAP-7 database contains information for 57 basic sectors. To keep the WorldScan model 
tractable, it is helpful to reduce this set of basic sectors to a smaller set of aggregated sectors, 
usually a number below 25. Basic sectors are subsumed under an aggregated sector based on their 
similarity from the perspective of the producer. However, in consumption studies considerably 
different aggregated sectors arise. Here the similarity of basic sectors is defined from the 
consumers' perspective. 
Correspondingly, the modelling of a sectoral consumption demand system in WorldScan must 
also be founded on aggregated consumption categories. This requires information on the relation 
between the aggregated production sectors and the aggregated consumption categories, which can 
be derived from the GTAP-7 database in the form of a concordance matrix. For that purpose, 
every GTAP-7 basic sector is classified in a more comprehensive producer based aggregated 
sector and a consumer based aggregated consumption category. This procedure yields a matrix 
with consumption values for every aggregated producer sector and consumer category 
combination within each region. The data matrix supplies the weights of the production sectors in 
the consumption categories for every region. The tax on consumption is calculated as the 
difference between consumption in market prices (before taxation) and in user prices (after 
taxation), which are both available from the GTAP-7 database. 
Consumption 
The Linear Expenditure System (LES) is suitable to model the consumption decision, because it 
combines simplicity with some flexibility. An extension of the GTAP-7 database provides a 
sound empirical underpinning for calibration of the LES. The GTAP-7 database is used to assign 
values to the parameters of the Linear Expenditure System. The standard GTAP-7 database 
contains input-output tables per region and trade data connecting these regions. From this dataset 
the sectoral consumption shares can be obtained. Besides that, additional consumption data are 
available from the GTAP-7 database: the elasticity of income per sector and region and the so-
called Frisch-parameter per region. The GTAP-7 database (Narayanan and Walmsley, 2008) 
derives the income elasticities for the food sectors from the FAO-model and bases the other 
income elasticities on previous empirical studies (see Lejour et al., 2006). 
Economic Growth 
The model considers the most recent developments of real GDP growth rates retrieved from the 
Commission services (European Commission, 2009) data and the IMF World Economic Outlook 
data (IMF, 2009) to ensure the consistency of the data for all countries of the world. To construct 
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the regional aggregates, we use the real GDP values at constant prices in 2004 (i.e. corresponding 
to the starting year of the model calibration) for the weights wi of individual country (i), so that 
the real GDP growth rate per region (r) is  , where, for example,   
for   . The adjustment of the baseline scenario to the current financial crisis in the 
sensitivity analysis is based upon the most recent GDP growth forecast data from the Commission 
services (European Commission, 2009c and 2009d) and the IMF World Economic Outlook (IMF, 
2009) available for individual countries of the EU27 and the world. For consistency reasons, both 
baselines contain the same GDP time series for the periods of 2000-2007 and from 2012 onwards. 
For the case of baseline without the crisis projections, the model trajectories of the economic 
growth are adjusted with respect to the recent update of GDP data to smoothen the transition from 
the real GDP series until 2007 and projections afterwards, as shown by Figure 1. For the case of 
the baseline with the crisis projections, the forecasted GDP data retrieved from the Commission 
services (European Commission, 2009c and 2009d) and the IMF-WEO (IMF, 2009) is used for 
the period from 2008 until 2012, as shown by Figure 2. The total factor productivity growth at 
sector-level is adjusted to arrive at the real GDP growth rate series and the energy use is 
endogenous with respect to economic activity. That is, the sectoral TFP growth is expressed as a 
function of macro-TFP growth and sectoral TFP growth relative to the macro-TFP growth rate. 
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The data on the coal and oil reserves come from the EPPA model, explained by Lejour (2006). 
These reserves include identified, undiscovered and currently uneconomic recoverable resources. 
For simulation over periods of 50 years or more, this broad definition is appropriate. For the gas, 
WorldScan uses data from the International Environment Agency (IEA), because this source 
provides more recent measurements and contains specific information on European countries. The 
excise duties are not explicitly defined in the model, but rather treated collectively in a taxation 
block of the model. The GTAP-7 database (Narayanan and Walmsley, 2008) supplies the data 
necessary to calibrate the parameters for the energy sectors. Additionally, the cost share data for 
biomass and non-fossil fuels derive from the IMAGE-TIMER model of the Dutch National 
Institute for Public Health and Environment (RIVM) and the Netherlands Environmental 
Assessment Agency (PBL). Data for non-CO2 greenhouse gas emission are provided by the 
RIVM. The current version of the climate change model includes carbon dioxide gas, but not the 
other non-CO2 green-house emissions. The sectoral flexibility of WorldScan allows consideration 
of as many types of the GHG as they are accounted for in the data. These non-CO2 greenhouse 
gases account for a considerable share of the total emissions (CO2 plus non-CO2), ranging from 
roughly 15% in the USA, the Rest of OECD and the EU-15 countries to almost 40% in Latin 
America.  
Human Capital 
The classification of high- and low-skilled workers follows the approach described by the recent 
CPB document (Boeters and Van Leeuwen, 2009). In sum, Boeters and Van Leeuwen (2009) 
construct value splits from independent information on quantities and prices, namely skill-specific 
employment information from the International Labour Office (ILO 2008) and information on 
relative wages provided by the Union Bank of Switzerland (UBS 2006). As explained thoroughly 
by Boeters and Van Leeuwen (2009) there are certain concerns related to the current labour input 
value split in the GTAP database, which motivated their revision.  First, the value split per sector 
and region relies on a relatively old and small dataset. Second, the skill-specific input values 
cannot be decomposed into a volume and a price component. Therefore, Boeters and Van 
Leeuwen (2009) propose the following procedure, which is applied in the model. In the first step, 
skilled and unskilled shares for employees per sector are derived from ILO (2008) statistics. In the 
second step, a skilled-to-unskilled wage ratio is retrieved from UBS (2006) statistics and it is 
assumed to be uniform across sectors. Finally, skilled to unskilled value ratios per sector are 
computed by combining the information from the previous two steps. These ratios are then used 
to split the value share of labour in GTAP. 
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Labour 
Supplies of skilled and unskilled labour are exogenous in the baseline. They depend upon 
demography, participation rates and the share of the high skilled in the total workforce. It uses 
certain mechanisms in projecting these developments until the year 2050. These projections are 
prerequisite for the assessment of the impacts of ageing. Population projections for the countries 
of the EU-15 are taken from Eurostat and for all other countries from the UN. For 24 population 
cohorts participation rates are projected using time series analysis. The data are a mixture of past 
observations and ILO-projections up to 2010. Aggregation of the projected rates over cohorts and 
individual countries yields macro participation rates for specific regions. Projections of skilled 
labour shares finally yield time series of the skilled and unskilled labour force. Though, in the 
climate policy version of WorldScan, the labour markets can be endogenized, this option has not 
been enabled in the simulations for this paper. 
Population 
Population projections are mainly taken from the revision 2002 of the UN World Population 
Prospects. These consist of alternative demographic projections until 2050 for all countries. The 
data and projections are provided in considerable detail, showing annual population sizes by 
gender and 5-year age cohort over the period 1950-2050 at country-level. Of the four projection 
alternatives available -- low, medium, high and constant fertility -- the medium variant is chosen. 
For the countries of EU-15, the baseline projections for the period 1999-2050 of Eurostat are 
used. 
Research and Development 
In the climate change version of WorldScan used in this paper, R&D is treated exogenously. 
However, WorldScan structure allows for endogenizing this parameter by employing the R&D 
data. In the R&D version of WorldScan, these data are retrieved as share of national income from 
OECD and UNESCO. The empirical relation between TFP growth and the R&D stocks is based 
on data of 14 OECD countries and 12 sectors for the period 1980 to 1999 in the R&D version of 
WorldScan. The data are from the ANBERD database of the OECD for the R&D expenditures, 
and from the STAN data base of the OECD to construct total factor productivity (TFP) growth 
and value added. The growth of TFP is related to the growth of the own sectoral spillovers, the 
domestic R&D spillovers from other sectors and the foreign R&D spillovers. 
Savings and Capital 
The data are derived from a variety of sources. Information on the age composition of economies 
is taken from the United Nations. Data on GDP per worker are taken from the Penn World Table 
(Mark 6.1). The measure for savings is average Gross Domestic Savings for the five-year periods 
distinguished in the analysis and is taken from the World Bank (World Development Indicators 
Database). Their data have been aggregated to the mentioned four age-groups. The savings come 
from the GTAP-7 database, depreciation is an exogenous variable, and labour supply growth 
follows from population and labour-market participation projections. 
Trade and Transport 
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The data on exports and imports come from the GTAP-7 database (Narayanan and Walmsley, 
2008). The allocation of sectoral demand over varieties from different regions is based on so-
called Armington preferences. The market shares of domestic and foreign producers depend on 
the preferences and relative prices. In the calibration the market shares are directly derived from 
the GTAP-7 database. This database provides information on the value of the trade flows and total 
demand within a region. The market shares are calculated based on these data. The market prices 
are a composite of the exogenous producer price (in the calibration year) and taxes and subsidies. 
Taxes and subsidies (including trade taxes) are also directly calculated from the GTAP-7 
database. The values of the Armington substitution elasticities are derived from other studies. The 
transport margins are calibrated using the GTAP-7 database. The database includes CIF-FOB 
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margins for each bilateral trade relation and for each commodity. The CIF-FOB margins measure 
the difference between the value at the importer's border and the value at the exporter's border. 
This margin is interpreted as the transport costs between the country of origin and destination. 
The import, export, and production tariffs are fixed as a percentage of the relevant prices 
according to the values in the GTAP-7 database. The non-tariff barriers are also expressed as tax 
rates. These rates are derived from estimations of gravity equations.                  European Economy - Economic Papers  No 406 
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ANNEX B: Art. 12 of the Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC) 
A clean development mechanism is hereby defined. The purpose of the clean development 
mechanism shall be to assist Parties not included in Annex I countries in achieving sustainable 
development and in contributing to the ultimate objective of the Convention, and to assist Parties 
included in Annex I countries in achieving compliance with their quantified emission limitation 
and reduction commitments under Article 3. 
Under the clean development mechanism: 
•  Parties not included in Annex I countries will benefit from project activities resulting in 
certified emission reductions; and 
•  Parties included in Annex I countries may use the certified emission reductions accruing 
from such project activities to contribute to compliance with part of their quantified 
emission limitation and reduction commitments under Article 3, as determined by the 
Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol. 
The clean development mechanism shall be subject to the authority and guidance of the 
Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol and be supervised 
by an executive board of the clean development mechanism. 
Emission reductions resulting from each project activity shall be certified by operational entities 
to be designated by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this 
Protocol, on the basis of: 
•  Voluntary participation approved by each Party involved; 
•  Real, measurable, and long-term benefits related to the mitigation of climate change; and 
•  Reductions in emissions that are additional to any that would occur in the absence of the 
certified project activity. 
The clean development mechanism shall assist in arranging funding of certified project activities 
as necessary. 
The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall, at its 
first session, elaborate modalities and procedures with the objective of ensuring transparency, 
efficiency and accountability through independent auditing and verification of project activities. 
The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall ensure 
that a share of the proceeds from certified project activities is used to cover administrative 
expenses as well as to assist developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the 
adverse effects of climate change to meet the costs of adaptation. 
Participation under the clean development mechanism, including in activities mentioned in 
paragraph 3 (a) above and in the acquisition of certified emission reductions, may involve private 
and/or public entities, and is to be subject to whatever guidance may be provided by the executive 
board of the clean development mechanism. 
Certified emission reductions obtained during the period from the year 2000 up to the beginning 
of the first commitment period can be used to assist in achieving compliance in the first 
commitment period. 
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ANNEX C: Additional Tables 
Regions Sectors Additional sector aggregates
EU27 Cereals Manufacturing
EU15 Oilseeds Services
EU12 Sugar crops Value added
Other Europe Other agriculture Emissions Trading System
Former Soviet Union Minerals Sectors where emissions occur
United States  Oil Energy sectors
Other OECD Coal Fuels
China and Hong Kong Petroleum and coal products Total
India Natural  gas 
Other South -East Asia Electricity Factors
Brazil 
,p
products   Low-skilled labour ,
America Paper products and publishing   High-skilled labour
Middle East and North Africa Mineral products nec   Capital
Rest of World  Ferrous metals   Land 
World Metals nec   Natural resources
Vegetable oils and fats
Climate policy related aggregates Other consumer goods Energy carriers
CDM demand & supply holders Capital goods and durables   Coal
Kyoto parties Road and rail transport   Petroleum, coal products
Annex I Other transport (water and air)   Natural gas
Non-Annex I Other services   Biodiesel





Table A1. Overview of regions, sectors and production inputs in climate version of WorldScan
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Table A1. Emissions ceilings for non-ETS sectors in the EU27
Member State greenhouse gas 
emission limits by 2020 
compared to 2005 greenhouse 
gas emission levels
Member State greenhouse gas 
emissions in 2020 resulting from 
the implementation of Article 3 
(in tonnes of CO2 equivalent)
Belgium -15% 70954356
Bulgaria 20% 35161279
























United Kingdom -16% 310387829
Source: European Union (2009).  